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Abstract
A general notion of algebraic conditional plausibility measures is dened. Probability
measures, ranking functions, possibility measures, and (under the appropriate denitions)
sets of probability measures can all be viewed as dening algebraic conditional plausibility
measures. It is shown that algebraic conditional plausibility measures can be represented
using Bayesian networks.
1. Introduction
Pearl (1988) among others has long argued that Bayesian networks (that is, the dags with-
out the conditional probability tables) represent important qualitative information about
uncertainty regarding conditional dependencies and independencies. To the extent that this
is true, Bayesian networks should make perfect sense for non-probabilistic representations
of uncertainty. And, indeed, Bayesian networks have been used with  rankings (Spohn,
1988) by Darwiche and Goldszmidt (1994). It follows from results of Wilson (1994) that
possibility measures (Dubois & Prade, 1990) can be represented using Bayesian networks.
The question I address in this paper is \What properties of a representation of uncer-
tainty are required to be able to represent the uncertainty using a Bayesian network?" This
question too has been addressed in earlier work, see (Darwiche, 1992; Darwiche & Ginsberg,
1992; Friedman & Halpern, 1995; Wilson, 1994), although the characterization given here
is somewhat dierent. Shenoy and Shafer (1990) consider a related question|essentially,
what is required of a representation of uncertainty so that marginals can be computed using
\local computations" of the type used in Bayesian networks|and provide axioms sucient
to guarantee that this is possible.
Here I represent uncertainty using plausibility measures, as in (Friedman & Halpern,
1995). To answer the question, I must examine general properties of conditional plausibility
as well as dening a notion of plausibilistic independence. Unlike earlier papers, I enforce a
symmetry condition in the denition of conditional independence, so that, for example, A is
independent of B i B is independent of A. While this property holds for probability, under
the asymmetric denition of independence used in earlier work it does not necessarily hold
for other formalisms. There are also subtle but important dierences between this paper
and (Friedman & Halpern, 1995) in the notion of conditional plausibility. The denitions
here are simpler but more general; particular attention is paid here to conditions on when
the conditional plausibility must be dened.
The major results here are a general condition, simpler than that given in (Friedman &
Halpern, 1995; Wilson, 1994), under which a conditional plausibility measure satises the
c
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semi-graphoid properties (which means it can be represented using a Bayesian network).
Conditions are also given that suce for a Bayesian network to be able to quantitatively
represent a plausibility measure; more precisely, conditions are given so that a plausibility
measure can be uniquely reconstructed given conditional plausibility tables for each node in
the Bayesian network. Conditions for quantitative representation by Bayesian networks do
not seem to have been presented in the literature for representations of uncertainty other
than probability (for which the conditions are trivial). A minor additional condition also
suces to guarantee that d-separation in the network characterizes conditional indepen-
dence. All these conditions clearly apply to  rankings and possibility measures. Perhaps
more interestingly, they also apply to sets of probabilities under a novel representation of
such sets as a plausibility measure. This novel representation (and the associated notion of
conditioning) is shown to have some natural properties not shared by other representations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss conditional plau-
sibility measures. Section 3 introduces algebraic conditional plausibility measures, which
are ones where there is essentially an analogue to + and . (Putting such an algebraic
structure on uncertainty is not new; it was also done in (Darwiche, 1992; Darwiche & Gins-
berg, 1992; Friedman & Halpern, 1995; Weydert, 1994).) Section 4 discusses independence
and conditional independence in conditional plausibility spaces, and shows that algebraic
conditional plausibility measures satisfy the semi-graphoid properties. Finally, in Section 5,
Bayesian networks based on (algebraic) plausibility measures are considered. Combining
the fact that algebraic plausibility measures satisfy the semi-graphoid properties with the
results of (Geiger, Verma, & Pearl, 1990), it follows that d-separation in a Bayesian net-
work G implies conditional independence for all algebraic plausibility measures compatible
with G; a weak richness condition is shown to yield the converse. The paper concludes in
Section 6. Longer proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. Conditional Plausibility
2.1 Unconditional Plausibility Measures
Before getting to conditional plausibility measures, it is perhaps best to consider uncondi-
tional plausibility measures. The basic idea behind plausibility measures is straightforward.
A probability measure maps subsets of a set W to [0; 1]. Its domain may not consist of
all subsets of W ; however, it is required to be an algebra. (Recall that an algebra F over
W is a set of subsets of W containing W and closed under union and complementation,
so that if U; V 2 F , then so are U [ V and U .) A plausibility measure is more general; it
maps elements in an algebra F to some arbitrary partially ordered set. If Pl is a plausibility
measure, then we read Pl(U) as \the plausibility of set U". If Pl(U)  Pl(V ), then V is at
least as plausible as U . Because the ordering is partial, it could be that the plausibility of
two dierent sets is incomparable. An agent may not be prepared to say of two sets that
one is more likely than another or that they are equal in likelihood.
Formally, a plausibility space is a tuple S = (W;F ;Pl), where W is a set of worlds, F
is an algebra over W , and Pl maps sets in F to some set D of plausibility values partially
ordered by a relation 
D
(so that 
D
is reexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric) that
contains two special elements >
D
and ?
D
such that ?
D

D
d 
D
>
D
for all d 2 D; these
are intended to be the analogues of 1 and 0 for probability. As usual, the ordering is dened
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<
D
by taking d
1
<
D
d
2
if d
1

D
d
2
and d
1
6= d
2
. I omit the subscript D from 
D
, <
D
, >
D
and ?
D
whenever it is clear from context.
There are three requirements on plausibility measures. The rst two are obvious ana-
logues of requirements that hold for other notions of uncertainty: the whole space gets
the maximum plausibility and the empty set gets the minimum plausibility. The third
requirement says that a set must be at least as plausible as any of its subsets.
Pl1. Pl(;) = ?
D
.
Pl2. Pl(W ) = >
D
.
Pl3. If U  U
0
, then Pl(U)  Pl(U
0
).
(In Pl3, I am implicitly assuming that U;U
0
2 F . Similar assumptions are made through-
out.)
All the standard representations of uncertainty in the literature can be represented as
plausibility measures. I briey describe some other representations of uncertainty that will
be of relevance to this paper.
Sets of probabilities: One common way of representing uncertainty is by a set of proba-
bility measures. This set is often assumed to be convex (see, for example, (Campos & Moral,
1995; Cousa, Moral, & Walley, 1999; Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1993; Levi, 1985; Walley, 1991)
for discussion and further references), however, convex sets do not seem appropriate for rep-
resenting independence assumptions, so I do not make this restriction here. For example,
if a coin with an unknown probability of heads is tossed twice, and the tosses are known to
be independent, it seems that a reasonable representation is given by the set P
0
consisting
of all measures 

, where 

(hh) = 
2
; 

(ht) = 

(th) = (1   ); 

(tt) = (1   )
2
.
Unfortunately, P
0
is not convex. Moreover, its convex hull includes many measures for
which the coin tosses are not independent. It is argued in (Cousa et al., 1999) that a set
of probability measures is behaviorally equivalent to its convex hull. However, even if we
accept this argument, it does not follow that a set and its convex hull are equivalent insofar
as determination of independencies goes.
There are a number of ways of viewing a set P of probability measures as a plausibility
measure. One uses the lower probability P

, dened as P

(U) = inff(U) :  2 Pg. Clearly
P

satises Pl1{3. The corresponding upper probability P

, dened as P

(U) = supf :  2
Pg = 1 P

(U), is also clearly a plausibility measure.
Both P

and P

give a way of comparing the likelihood of two subsets U and V of W .
These two ways are incomparable; it is easy to nd a set P of probability measures on W
and subsets U and V of W such that P

(U) < P

(V ) and P

(U) > P

(V ). Rather than
choosing between P

and P

, we can associate a dierent plausibility measure with P that
captures both. Let D
P

;P

= f(a; b) : 0  a  b  1g and dene (a; b)  (a
0
; b
0
) i b  a
0
.
This puts a partial order on D
P

;P

; clearly ?
D
P

;P

= (0; 0) and >
D
P

;P

= (1; 1). Dene
Pl
P

;P

(U) = (P

(U);P

(U)). Thus, Pl
P

;P

associates with a set U two numbers that can
be thought of as dening an interval in terms of the lower and upper probability of U . It
is easy to check that Pl
P

;P

(U)  Pl
P

;P

(V ) if the upper probability of U is less than or
equal to the lower probability of V . Pl
P

;P

satises Pl1{3, so it is indeed a plausibility
measure, but one which puts only a partial order on events.
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The trouble with P

, P

, and even Pl
P

;P

is that they lose information. For example,
it is not hard to nd a set P of probability measures and subsets U; V of W such that
(U)  (V ) for all  2 P and (U) < (V ) for some  2 P, but P

(U) = P

(V ) and
P

(U) = P

(V ). Indeed, there exists an innite set P of probability measures such that
(U) < (V ) for all  2 P but P

(U) = P

(V ) and P

(U) = P

(V ). If all the probability
measures in P agree that U is less likely than V , it seems reasonable to conclude that U is
less likely than V . However, none of P

, P

, or Pl
P

;P

will necessarily draw this conclusion.
Fortunately, it is not hard to associate yet another plausibility measure with P that
does not lose this important information. For technical convenience that will become clear
later, assume that there is some index set I such that P = f
i
: i 2 Ig. Thus, for example,
if P = f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g, then I = f1; : : : ; ng. Let D
I
= [0; 1]
I
, that is, the functions from I to
[0; 1], with the pointwise ordering, so that f  g i f(i)  g(i) for all i 2 I.
1
It is easy to
check that ?
D
I
is the function f : I ! [0; 1] such that f(i) = 0 for all i 2 I and >
D
I
is the
function g such that g(i) = 1 for all i 2 I. For U  W , let f
U
be the function such that
f
U
(i) = 
i
(U) for all i 2 I. For example, for the set P
0
of measures representing the two
coin tosses (which is indexed by IR), the set W can be taken to be fhh; ht; tt; thg. Then,
for example, f
fhhg
() = 

(hh) = 
2
and f
fht;ttg
() = 1  .
It is easy to see that f
;
= ?
D
I
and f
W
= >
D
I
. Now dene Pl
P
(U) = f
U
. Thus,
Pl
P
(U)  Pl
P
(V ) i f
U
(i)  f
V
(i) for all i 2 I i (U)  (V ) for all  2 P. Clearly Pl
P
satises Pl1{3. Pl1 and Pl2 follow since Pl
P
(;) = f
;
= ?
D
I
and Pl
P
(W ) = f
W
= >
D
I
,
while Pl3 follows since if U  V then (U)  (V ) for all  2 P. Pl
P
captures all the
information in P (unlike, say, P

, which washes much of it away by taking infs).
This way of associating a plausibility measure with a set P of probability measures
generalizes: it provides a way of associating a single plausibility measure with any set of
plausibility measures; I leave the straightforward details to the reader.
Possibility measures: A fuzzy measure (or a Sugeno measure) f on W (Wang & Klir,
1992) is a function f : 2
W
7! [0; 1], that satises Pl1{3. (That is, it is less general than a
plausibility measure only in that it requires the range to be [0; 1] rather than an arbitrary
partially ordered set.) A possibility measure Poss onW is a special case of a Sugeno measure;
it is a function mapping subsets of W to [0; 1] such that Poss(W ) = 1, Poss(;) = 0, and
Poss(U) = sup
w2U
(Poss(fwg)), so that Poss(U [ V ) = max(Poss(U);Poss(V )) (Dubois &
Prade, 1990). Clearly a possibility measure is a plausibility measure.
Ranking functions: An ordinal ranking (or -ranking or ranking function)  on W (as
dened by (Goldszmidt & Pearl, 1992), based on ideas that go back to (Spohn, 1988))
is a function mapping subsets of W to IN

= IN [ f1g such that (W ) = 0, (;) =
1, and (U) = min
w2U
((fwg)), so that (U [ V ) = min((U); (V )). Intuitively, a
ranking function assigns a degree of surprise to each subset of worlds in W , where 0 means
unsurprising and higher numbers denote greater surprise. It is easy to see that if  is a
ranking function on W , then (W; 2
W
; ) is a plausibility space, where x 
IN

y if and only
if y  x under the usual ordering on the natural numbers. One standard view of a ranking
1. In the conference version of this paper (Halpern, 2000), D
I
, the range of the plausibility measure, was
taken to be functions from P to [0; 1], not from the index set I to [0; 1]. The dierence is mainly cosmetic,
but this representation makes the range independent of P, so that the same plausibility values can be
used for any set of probability measures indexed by I.
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function, going back to Spohn, is that a ranking of k can be associated with a probability
of 
k
, for some xed (possibly innitesimal) . Note that this viewpoint justies taking
(W ) = 0, (;) =1, and (U [ V ) = min((U); (V )).
2.2 Conditional Plausibility Measures
Since Bayesian networks make such heavy use of conditioning, my interest here is not just
plausibility measures, but conditional plausibility measures (cpm's). Given a set W of
worlds, a cpm maps pairs of subsets of W to some partially ordered set D. I write Pl(U jV )
rather than Pl(U; V ), in keeping with standard notation for conditioning. In the case of
a probability measure , it is standard to take (U jV ) to be undened in (V ) = 0. In
general, we must make precise what the allowable second arguments are. Thus, I take
the domain of a cpm to have the form F  F
0
where, intuitively, F
0
consists of those sets
in F on which it makes sense to condition. For example, for a conditional probability
measure dened in the usual way from an unconditional probability measure , F
0
consists
of all sets V such that (V ) > 0. (Note that F
0
is not an algebra|it is not closed under
complementation.) A Popper algebra over W is a set F F
0
of subsets of W W satisfying
the following properties:
Acc1. F is an algebra over W .
Acc2. F
0
is a nonempty subset of F .
Acc3. F
0
is closed under supersets in F ; that is, if V 2 F
0
, V  V
0
, and V
0
2 F , then
V
0
2 F
0
.
(Popper algebras are named after Karl Popper, who was the rst to consider formally
conditional probability as the basic notion (Popper, 1968). De Finetti (1936) also did some
early work, apparently independently, taking conditional probabilities as primitive. Indeed,
as Renyi (1964) points out, the idea seems to go back as far as Keynes (1921).)
A conditional plausibility space (cps) is a tuple (W;F ;F
0
;Pl), where F F
0
is a Popper
algebra over W , Pl : F F
0
! D, D is a partially ordered set of plausibility values, and Pl
is a conditional plausibility measure (cpm) that satises the following conditions:
CPl1. Pl(;jV ) = ?
D
.
CPl2. Pl(W jV ) = >
D
.
CPl3. If U  U
0
, then Pl(U jV )  Pl(U
0
jV ).
CPl4 Pl(U jV ) = Pl(U \ V jV ).
CPl1{3 are the obvious analogues to Pl1{3. CPl4 is a minimal property that guarantees
that when conditioning on V , everything is relativized to V . It follows easily from CPl1{4
that Pl(jV ) is a plausibility measure on V for each xed V . A cps is acceptable if it satises
Acc4. If V 2 F
0
, U 2 F , and Pl(U jV ) 6= ?
D
, then U \ V 2 F
0
.
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Acceptability is a generalization of the observation that if Pr(V ) 6= 0, then conditioning on
V should be dened. It says that if Pl(U jV ) 6= ?
D
, then conditioning on V \ U should be
dened.
CPl1{4 are rather minimal requirements. For example, they do not place any constraints
on the relationship between Pl(U jV ) and Pl(U jV
0
) if V 6= V
0
. One natural additional
condition is the following.
CPl5. If V \V
0
2 F
0
and U;U
0
2 F , then Pl(U jV \ V
0
)  Pl(U
0
jV \V
0
) i Pl(U \ V jV
0
) 
Pl(U
0
\ V jV
0
).
It is not hard to show that CPl5 implies CPl4.
Lemma 2.1: CPl5 implies CPl4.
Proof: Since clearly Pl(U \V jV ) = Pl(U\V \V jV ), by CPl5 it follows that Pl(U jV \V ) =
Pl(U \ V jV \ V ), and hence Pl(U jV ) = Pl(U \ V jV ).
CPl5 does not follow from CPl1{4 (indeed, as shown below, the standard notion of
conditioning for lower probabilities satises CPl1{4 but not CPl5). A cps that satises
CPl5 is said to be coherent. Although I do not assume CPl5 here, it in fact holds for all
plausibility measures to which one of the main results applies (see Lemma 3.5).
In any case, CPl5 is certainly not the only coherence that might be required. For
example, it may seem reasonable to require that if V and V
0
are disjoint, then it is not the
case that both Pl(U jV [ V
0
) > Pl(U jV ) and Pl(U jV [ V
0
) > Pl(U jV
0
). Similarly, we may
want to require that it not be the case that Pl(U jV [ V
0
) < Pl(U jV ) and Pl(U jV [ V
0
) <
Pl(U jV
0
).
2
Coming up with a reasonable set of coherence conditions remains a topic for
future work. The only properties needed for the results of this paper are CPl1{4.
The notion of cps considered here is closely related to that dened in (Friedman &
Halpern, 1995). There, a cps is taken to be a family fW;D
V
;Pl
V
) : V  W;V 6= ;g of
plausibility spaces, where each plausibility measure Pl
V
satises Pl1{3 and has domain 2
W
and an analogue of CPl5 holds: Pl
V \V
0
(U)  Pl
V \V
0
(U
0
) i Pl
V
0
(U \V )  Pl
V
0
(U
0
\V ). To
distinguish the denition of cps given in this paper from that given in (Friedman & Halpern,
1995), I call the latter an FH-cps. There is no analogue to Acc1{4 in (Friedman & Halpern,
1995); F is implicitly taken to be 2
W
, while F
0
is implicitly taken to be 2
W
  f;g. This is
an inessential dierence between the denitions. More signicantly, note that in an FH-cps,
(W;D
V
;Pl
V
) is a plausibility space for each xed V , and thus satises Pl1{3. However,
requiring CPl1{3 is a priori stronger than requiring Pl1{3 for each separate plausibility
space. Pl1 requires that Pl(;jV ) = ?
D
V
, but the elements ?
D
V
may be dierent for each
V . By way of contrast, CPl1 requires that Pl(?jV ) must be the same element, ?
D
, for all
V . Similar remarks hold for Pl2. Nevertheless, as is shown below, there is a construction
that converts an FH-cps to a coherent cps.
I now consider some standard ways of getting a cps starting with an unconditional
representation of uncertainty.
Denition 2.2: A cps (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) extends an unconditional plausibility space (W;F ;Pl
0
)
if Pl(U jW ) = Pl
0
(U). (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) is standard if F
0
= fU : Pl(U) 6= ?g.
All the constructions below result in standard cps's.
2. I think an anonymous referee of this paper for suggesting this condition.
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Ranking functions: Given an unconditional ranking function , there is a well-known
way of extending it to a conditional ranking function:
(U jV ) =
(
(U \ V )  (V ) if (V ) 6=1,
undened if (V ) =1.
This is consistent with the view that if (V ) = k, then (V ) = 
k
, since then (U jV ) =

(U\V ) (V )
. It is easy to check that this denition results in a coherent cps.
Possibility measures: There are two standard ways of dening a conditional possibility
measure from an unconditional possibility measure Poss. To distinguish them, I write
Poss(U jV ) for the rst approach and Poss(U jjV ) for the second approach. According to the
rst approach,
Poss(U jV ) =
8
>
<
>
:
Poss(V \ U) if Poss(V \ U) < Poss(V ),
1 if Poss(V \ U) = Poss(V ) > 0,
undened if Poss(V ) = 0.
The second approach looks more like conditioning in probability:
Poss(U jjV ) =
(
Poss(V \ U)=Poss(V ) if Poss(V ) > 0,
undened if Poss(V ) = 0.
It is easy to show that both denitions result in a coherent cps. (Many other notions of
conditioning for possibility measures can be dened; see, for example (Fonck, 1994). I focus
on these two because they are the ones most-often considered in the literature.)
Sets of probabilities: For a set P of probabilities, conditioning can be dened for all
the representations of P as a plausibility measure. But in each case there are subtle choices
involving when conditioning is undened. For example, one denition of conditional lower
probability is that P

(U jV ) is inff(U jV ) : (V ) 6= 0g if (V ) 6= 0 for all  2 P, and is
undened otherwise (i.e., if (V ) = 0 for some  2 P). It is easy to check that P

dened
this way gives a coherent cpm, as does the corresponding denition of P

. The problem
with this denition is that it may result in a rather small set F
0
for which conditioning
is dened. For example, if for each set V 6= W , there is some measure  2 P such that
(V ) = 0 (which can certainly happen in some nontrivial examples), then F
0
= fWg. As
a consequence, the cps dened in this way is not acceptable (i.e., does not satisfy Acc4) in
general.
The following denition gives a lower probability which is dened on more arguments:
P

(U jV ) =
(
inff(U jV ) : (V ) 6= 0g if (V ) 6= 0 for some  2 P,
undened if (V ) = 0 for all  2 P.
It is easy to see that this denition agrees with the rst one whenever the rst is dened and
results, in general, in a larger set F
0
. Moreover, the resulting cps is acceptable. However,
the second denition does not satisfy CPl5. For example, suppose that W = fa; b; cg and
P = f; 
0
g, where (a) = (b) = 0, (c) = 1, 
0
(a) = 2=3, 
0
(b) = 1=3, and 
0
(c) = 0.
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Taking V = fa; bg, U = fag, and U
0
= fbg, it is easy to see that according to the second
denition, P

(U \ V jW ) = P

(U
0
\ V jW ) = 0, but P

(U jV ) > P

(U
0
jV ).
For Pl
P
, there are two analogous denitions. For the rst, Pl
P
(U jV ) is dened only if
(V ) > 0 for all  2 P, in which case Pl
P
(U jV ) is f
U jV
, where f
U jV
(i) = 
i
(U jV ). This
denition gives a coherent cps, but again, in general, not one that is acceptable. In this
paper, I focus on the following denition, which does result in an acceptable cps.
First extend D
I
by allowing functions which have value  (intuitively,  denotes unde-
ned). More precisely, letD
0
I
consist of all functions f from I to [0; 1][fg such that f(i) 6= 
for at least one i 2 I. The idea is to dene Pl
P
(U jV ) = f
U jV
, where f
U jV
(i) = 
i
(U jV )
if 
i
(V ) > 0 and  otherwise. (Note that this agrees with the previous denition, which
applies only to the situation where (V ) > 0 for all  2 P.) There is a problem though,
one to which I have already alluded. CPl1 says that f
;jV
must be ? for all V . Thus, it
must be the case that f
;jV
1
= f
;jV
2
for all V
1
; V
2
 W . But if 
i
2 P and V
1
; V
2
 W are
such that 
i
(V
1
) > 0 and 
i
(V
2
) = 0, then f
;jV
1
(i) = 0 and f
;jV
2
(i) = , so f
;jV
1
6= f
;jV
2
. A
similar problem arises with CPl2.
To deal with this problem D
0
I
must be slightly modied. Say that f 2 D
0
I
is equivalent
to ?
D

I
if f(i) is either 0 or * for all i 2 I; similarly, f is equivalent to >
D

I
if f(i) is
either 1 or * for all i 2 I. (Since, by denition, f(i) 6=  for at least one i 2 I, an
element cannot be equivalent to both >
D

I
and ?
D

I
.) Let D

I
be the same as D
0
I
except
that all elements equivalent to ?
D
I
are identied (and viewed as one element) and all
elements equivalent to >
D

I
are identied. More precisely, let D

I
= f?
D

I
;>
D

I
g [ ff 2 D
0
:
f is not equivalent to >
D

I
or ?
D

I
g. Dene the ordering  on D

I
by taking f  g if one of
the following three conditions holds:
 f = ?
D

I
,
 g = >
D

I
,
 neither f nor g is ?
D

I
or >
D

I
and for all i 2 I, either f(i) = g(i) =  or f(i) 6= ,
g(i) 6= , and f(i)  g(i).
Now dene
Pl
P
(U jV ) =
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
?
D

I
if (V ) 6= 0 for some  2 P and
(V ) 6= 0 implies (U jV ) = 0 for all  2 P,
>
D

I
if 9 2 P((V ) 6= 0) and 8 2 P((V ) 6= 0) (U jV ) = 1),
undened if (V ) = 0 for all  2 P,
f
U jV
otherwise.
It is easy to check that this gives a coherent cps.
Plausibility measures: The construction for Pl
P
can be used to convert any FH-cps
to a cps. I demonstrate the idea by showing how to construct a conditional plausibility
measure from an unconditional plausibility measure. Given an unconditional plausibility
space (W;F ;Pl) with range D, an FH-cps is constructed in (Friedman & Halpern, 1995) by
dening Pl(U jV ) = Pl(U \ V ). Thus, D
V
= fd 2 D : d  Pl(V )g and >
D
V
= Pl(V ). This
is not a cps because CPl2 is not satised, but it is an FH-cps, since Pl1{3 is satised for
each xed V , and so is CPl5. As observed in (Friedman & Halpern, 1995), this is in fact
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the FH-cps extending Pl that makes the minimal number of comparisons, in the sense that
if Pl
0
is an FH-cps extending Pl and Pl(U jV )  Pl(U
0
jV ), then Pl
0
(U jV )  Pl
0
(U
0
jV ).
To get a cps, let D
0
= f(d; V ) : V  W; d  Pl(V ); Pl(V ) > ?
D
g. Say that (d; V ) is
equivalent to ?
D

if d = ?
D
; say that (d; V ) is equivalent to >
D

if d = Pl(V ). Now let
D

= f?
D

;>
D

g [ ff 2 D
0
: f is not equivalent to >
D

or ?
D

g. Then dene d 
D

d
0
for d; d
0
2 D

i d = ?
D

, d
0
= >
D

, or there is some V  W such that d = (d
1
; V ),
d
0
= (d
2
; V ), and d
1

D
d
2
. Finally, for U; V 2 F , dene
Pl(U jV ) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
(Pl(U \ V ); V ) if ?
D
< Pl(U \ V ) < Pl(V ),
>
D

if Pl(U \ V ) = Pl(V ) > ?
D
,
?
D

if Pl(U \ V ) = ?
D
, Pl(V ) > ?
D
,
undened if Pl(V ) = ?
D
.
I leave it to the reader to check that Pl is a coherent cpm. It is important that Pl(U jV ) is
undened if Pl(V ) = ?
D
; if we tried to extend the construction to V such that Pl(V ) = ?
D
,
then we would have >
D

= ?
D

. This issue did not arise in (Friedman & Halpern, 1995),
since there were separate plausibility spaces for each choice of V .
3. Algebraic Conditional Plausibility Measures
To be able to carry out the type of reasoning used in Bayesian networks, it does not suce to
just have conditional plausibility. We need to have analogues of addition and multiplication.
More precisely, there needs to be some way of computing the plausibility of the union of
two disjoint sets in terms of the plausibility of the individual sets and a way of computing
Pl(U \ V jV
0
) given Pl(U jV \ V
0
) and Pl(V jV
0
).
Denition 3.1: A cps (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) where Pl has range D is algebraic if it is acceptable
and there are functions  : D  D ! D and 
 : D  D ! D such that the following
properties hold:
Alg1. If U;U
0
2 F are disjoint and V 2 F
0
then Pl(U [ U
0
jV ) = Pl(U jV ) Pl(U
0
jV ).
Alg2. If U 2 F , V \ V
0
2 F
0
, then Pl(U \ V jV
0
) = Pl(U jV \ V
0
)
 Pl(V jV
0
).
Alg3. 
 distributes over ; more precisely, a 
 (b
1
     b
n
) = (a 
 b
1
)      (a 
 b
n
)
if (a; b
1
); : : : ; (a; b
n
); (a; b
1
     b
n
) 2 Dom
Pl
(
) and (b
1
; : : : ; b
n
); (a 
 b
1
; : : : ; a 

b
n
) 2 Dom
Pl
(), where Dom
Pl
() = f(Pl(U
1
jV ); : : : ;Pl(U
n
jV )) : U
1
; : : : ; U
n
2 F are
pairwise disjoint and V 2 F
0
g and Dom
Pl
(
) = f(Pl(U jV \ V
0
);Pl(V jV
0
)) : U 2
F ; V \ V
0
2 F
0
g.
3
(See below for a discussion of Dom
Pl
() and Dom
Pl
(
). In the
sequel, I omit the subscript Pl if it is clear from context.)
Alg4. If (a; c); (b; c) 2 Dom(
), a
 c  b
 c, and c 6= ?, then a  b.
3. In the conference version of this paper, Dom() was taken to consist only of pairs, not tuples of arbitrary
nite length, and distributivity was considered only for terms of the form a
 (b b
0
). The more general
version considered here is slightly stronger. The reason is that it is possible that (a; b
1
     b
n
) 2
Dom(
) even though (a; b
1
     b
k
) =2 Dom(
) for k  n. Note also that only left distributivity is
required here.
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I sometimes refer to the cpm Pl as being algebraic as well.
It may seem more natural to consider a stronger version of Alg4 that applies to all pairs
in D D, such as
Alg4
0
. If a
 c  b
 c and c 6= ?, then a  b.
However, as Proposition 3.2 below shows, by requiring that Alg3 and Alg4 hold only for
tuples in Dom() and Dom(
) rather than on all tuples in D D, some cps's of interest
become algebraic that would otherwise not be. Intuitively, we care about 
 mainly to the
extent that Alg1 and Alg2 holds, and Alg1 and Alg2 apply only to tuples in Dom() and
Dom(
), respectively. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable that Alg4 be required to hold
only for these tuples.
Proposition 3.2: The constructions for extending an unconditional probability measure,
ranking function, possibility measure (using either Poss(U jV ) or Poss(U jjV )), and the plau-
sibility measure Pl
P
dened by a set P of probability measures to a cps result in algebraic
cps's.
4
Proof: It is easy to see that in each case the cps is acceptable. It is also easy to nd
appropriate notions of 
 and  in the case of probability measures, ranking functions, and
possibility measures using Poss(U jjV ). For probability, clearly  and 
 are essentially +
and ; however, since the range of probability is [0; 1], ab must be dened as max(1; a+b),
and Alg3 holds only for Dom() = f(a
1
; : : : ; a
k
) : a
1
+  +a
k
 1g; there is no constraint on
Dom(); it is [0; 1]  [0; 1]. For ranking,  and 
 are min and +; there are no constraints
on Dom(min) and Dom(+). For Poss(U jjV ),  is max and 
 is ; again, there are no
constraints on Dom(max) and Dom(). I leave it to the reader to check that Alg1{4 hold
in all these cases.
For Poss(U jV ),  is again max and 
 is min. There are no constraints on Dom(max);
however, note that (a; b) 2 Dom(min) i either a < b or a = 1. For suppose that (a; b) =
(Poss(U jV \ V
0
);Poss(V jV
0
), where U 2 F and V \ V
0
2 F
0
. If Poss(U \ V \ V
0
) =
Poss(V \V
0
) then a = Poss(U jV \ V
0
) = 1; otherwise, Poss(U \ V \V
0
) < Poss(V \ V
0
), in
which case a = Poss(U jV \ V
0
) = Poss(U \ V \ V
0
) < Poss(V \ V
0
)  Poss(V jV
0
) = b. It
is easy to check Alg1{3. While min does not satisfy Alg4
0
|certainly min(a; c) = min(b; c)
does not in general imply that a = b|Alg4 does hold. For if min(a; c)  min(b; c) and
a = 1, then clearly b = 1. Alternatively, if a < c, then min(a; c) = a and the only way that
a  min(b; c), given that b < c or b = 1, is if a  b.
Finally, for Pl
P
,  and 
 are essentially pointwise addition and multiplication. But
there are a few subtleties. As in the case of probability, Dom() consists of sequences
which sum to at most 1 for each index i. Care must also be taken in dealing with ?
D

I
and
>
D

I
. More precisely, Dom() consists of all tuples (f
1
; : : : ; f
n
) such that either
1(a). f
j
6= >
D

I
; j = 1; : : : ; n,
1(b). if f
j
; f
k
6= ?
D

I
for 1  j; k  n, then f
j
(i) =  i f
k
(i) = , for all i 2 I, and
4. Essentially the same result is proved in (Friedman & Halpern, 1995) for all cases but Pl
P
.
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1(c).
P
fj:f
j
6=?
D

I
;f
j
(i)6=g
f
j
(i)  1
or
2. there exists j such that f
j
= >
D

I
and f
k
= ?
D

I
for k 6= j;
Dom(
) consists of pairs (f; g) such that either one of f or g is in f?
D

I
;>
D

I
g or neither
f nor g is in f?
D

I
;>
D

I
g and g(i) 2 f0; g i f(i) = . The denition of  is relatively
straightforward. Dene f  >
D

I
= >
D

I
 f = >
D

I
and f  ?
D

I
= ?
D

I
 f = f . If
f; g \ f?
D

I
;>
D

I
g = ;, then f  g = h, where h(i) = min(1; f(i) + g(i)) (taking a +  =
 + a =  and min(1; ) = ). In a similar spirit, dene f 
 >
D

I
= >
D

I

 f = f
and f 
 ?
D

I
= ?
D

I

 f = ?
D

I
; if ff; gg \ f?
D

I
;>
D

I
g = ;, then f 
 g = h, where
h(i) = f(i) g(i) (taking  a = a =  if a 6= 0 and  0 = 0 = 0). It is important
that   0 = 0 and    = , since otherwise Alg3 may not hold. For example, according
to Alg3,
((1=2; ; 1=2)
(a; 0; b))((1=2; ; 1=2))
(a; 0; b)) = ((1=2; ; 1=2)(1=2; ; 1=2))
(a; 0; b) = (a; 0; b)
(since (1=2; ; 1=2)(1=2; ; 1=2) = >
D

I
) and, similarly, ((1=2; ; 1=2)
(a; ; b))((1=2; ; 1=2))

(a; ; b)) = (a; ; b). Since   0 = 0 and    = , these equalities hold. I leave it to the
reader to check that, with these denitions, Alg1{4 hold (although note that the restrictions
to Dom() and Dom(
) are required for both Alg3 and Alg4 to hold).
Conditional lower probability is not algebraic. For example, it is not hard to construct
pairwise disjoint sets U
1
, V
1
, U
2
, and V
2
and a set P of probability measures such that
P

(U
i
) = P

(V
i
) (and P

(U
i
) = P

(V
i
)) for i = 1; 2, but P

(U
1
[ U
2
) 6= P

(V
1
[ V
2
). That
means there cannot be a function  in the case of lower probability.
5
For later convenience, I list some simple properties of algebraic cpms that show that ?
and > act like 0 and 1 with respect to addition and multiplication. Let Range(Pl) = fd :
Pl(U jV ) = d for some (U; V ) 2 F  F
0
g.
Lemma 3.3: If (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) is an algebraic cps, then d  ? = ?  d = d for all d 2
Range(Pl).
Proof: Suppose that d = Pl(U jV ). By Alg1, it follows that
d = Pl(U jV ) = Pl(U [ ;jV ) = Pl(U jV ) Pl(;jV ) = d?:
A similar argument shows that d = ? d.
Lemma 3.4: If (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) is an algebraic cps then, for all d 2 Range(Pl),
(a) d
> = d;
5. For readers familiar with Dempster-Shafer belief functions (Shafer, 1976), they provide another example
of a plausibility measure. There are two well-known ways of dening conditioning for belief functions
(see (Fagin & Halpern, 1991)), one using Dempster's rule of combination and the other treating belief
functions as lower probabilities. Neither leads to an algebraic cps, which is why I have not discussed
belief functions in this paper.
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(b) if d 6= ?, then >
 d = d;
(c) if d 6= ?, then ?
 d = ?;
(d) if (d;?) 2 Dom(
), then >
? = d
? = ?
? = ?.
Proof: Suppose that d = Pl(U jV ). By Alg2, CPl2, and CPl4, it follows that
d = Pl(U jV ) = Pl(U \ V jV ) = Pl(U jV )
 Pl(V jV ) = d
>:
Similarly, if d 6= ?, then U \ V 2 F
0
(by Acc4), so
d = Pl(U jV ) = Pl(U \ V jV ) = Pl(U \ V jU \ V )
 Pl(U \ V jV ) = >
 d:
If d 6= ?, then by Alg2, CPl1, and CPl4
? = Pl(?jV ) = Pl(?jU \ V )
 Pl(U jV ) = ?
 d:
Finally, if (d;?) 2 Dom(
), then there exist U; V; V
0
such that V \V
0
2 F
0
, Pl(U jV \V
0
) = d
and Pl(V jV
0
) = ?. By Alg2, Pl(U \ V jV
0
) = Pl(U jV \ V
0
)
 Pl(V jV
0
) = d
?. By CPl3,
Pl(U \ V jV
0
)  Pl(V jV
0
) = ?, so Pl(U \ V jV
0
) = ?. Thus, d 
 ? = ?. Replacing U
with V \ V
0
, the same argument shows that > 
 ? = ?; replacing U with ;, we get that
?
? = ?.
I conclude this section by showing that a standard algebraic cps that satises one other
minimal property must also satisfy CPl5. Say that 
 is monotonic if d  d
0
and e  e
0
then
d
 e  d
0

 e
0
. A cpm (cps) is monotonic if 
 is.
Lemma 3.5: A standard algebraic monotonic cps satises CPl5.
Proof: Suppose that (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) is a standard algebraic cps and that V \ V
0
2 F
0
. If
Pl(U jV \ V
0
)  Pl(U
0
jV \ V
0
), then it follows from Alg2 and monotonicity that
Pl(U \ V jV
0
) = Pl(U jV \ V
0
)
 Pl(V jV
0
)  Pl(U
0
jV \ V
0
)
 Pl(V jV
0
) = Pl(U
0
\ V jV
0
):
For the opposite implication, suppose that Pl(U \ V jV
0
)  Pl(U
0
\ V jV
0
). Then, by Alg2,
Pl(U jV \ V
0
)
 Pl(V jV
0
)  Pl(U
0
jV \ V
0
)
 Pl(V jV
0
): (1)
Since V \V
0
2 F
0
and the cps is standard, it must be the case that Pl(V \V
0
) 6= ?. Hence (by
CPl3), Pl(V
0
) 6= ?; moreover, Pl(V jV
0
) 6= ? (otherwise Pl(V \ V
0
) = Pl(V jV
0
)
 Pl(V
0
) =
?). Thus, by applying Alg4 to (1), it follows that Pl(U jV \ V
0
)  Pl(U
0
jV \ V
0
).
4. Independence
How can we capture formally the notion that two events are independent? Intuitively, it
means that they have nothing to do with each other|they are totally unrelated; the oc-
currence of one has no inuence on the other. None of the representations of uncertainty
that we have been considering can express the notion of \unrelatedness" (whatever it might
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mean) directly. The best we can do is to capture the \footprint" of independence on the
notion. For example, in the case of probability, if U and V are unrelated, it seems reason-
able to expect that learning U should not aect the probability of V and symmetrically,
learning V should not aect the probability of U . \Unrelatedness" is, after all, a symmetric
notion.
6
The fact that U and V are probabilistically independent (with respect to proba-
bility measure ) can thus be expressed as (U jV ) = (U) and (V jU) = (V ). There is a
technical problem with this denition: What happens if (V ) = 0? In that case (U jV ) is
undened. Similarly, if (U) = 0 then (V jU) is undened. It is conventional to say that,
in this case, U and V are still independent. This leads to the following formal denition.
Denition 4.1: U and V are probabilistically independent (with respect to probability mea-
sure ) if (V ) 6= 0 implies (U jV ) = (U) and (U) 6= 0 implies (V jU) = (V ).
This does not look like the standard denition of independence in texts, but an easy
calculation shows that it is equivalent.
Proposition 4.2: The following are equivalent:
(a) (U) 6= 0 implies (V jU) = (V ),
(b) (U \ V ) = (U)(V ),
(c) (V ) 6= 0 implies (U jV ) = (U).
Thus, in the case of probability, it would be equivalent to say that U and V are inde-
pendent with respect to  if (U \ V ) = (U)(V ) or to require only that (U jV ) = (U)
if (V ) 6= 0 without requiring that (V jU) = (V ) if (U) 6= 0. However, these equiv-
alences do not necessarily hold for other representations of uncertainty. The denition of
independence I have given here seems to generalize more appropriately.
7
The denition of probabilistic conditional independence is analogous.
Denition 4.3: U and V are probabilistically independent given V
0
(with respect to proba-
bility measure ) if (V \V
0
) 6= 0 implies (U jV \V
0
) = (U jV
0
) and (U \V
0
) 6= 0 implies
(V jU \ V
0
) = (V jV
0
).
It is immediate that U and V are (probabilistically) independent i they are independent
conditional on W .
The generalization to conditional plausibility measures (and hence to all other represen-
tations of uncertainty that we have been considering) is straightforward.
Denition 4.4: Given a cps (W;F ;F
0
;Pl), U; V 2 F are plausibilistically independent
given V
0
2 F (with respect to the cpm Pl), written I
Pl
(U; V jV
0
), if V \ V
0
2 F
0
implies
Pl(U jV \ V
0
) = Pl(U jV
0
) and U \ V
0
2 F
0
implies Pl(V jU \ V
0
) = Pl(V jV
0
).
6. Walley (1991) calls the asymmetric notion irrelevance and denes U being independent of V as U is
irrelevant to V and V is irrelevant to U . Although my focus here is independence, irrelevance is an
interesting notion in its own right; see (Cozman, 1998; Cozman & Walley, 1999).
7. Another property of probabilistic independence is that if U is independent of V then U is independent
of V . This too does not follow for the other representations of uncertainty, and Walley (1991) actually
makes this part of his denition. Adding this requirement would not aect any of the results here,
although it would make the proofs somewhat lengthier, so I have not made it part of the denition.
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We are interested in conditional independence of random variables as well as in con-
ditional independence of events. All the standard denitions extend to plausibility in a
straightforward way. A random variable X on W is a function from W to the reals. Let
R(X) be the set of possible values for X (that is, the set of values over which X ranges). As
usual, X = x is the event fw : X(w) = xg. If X = fX
1
; : : : ;X
k
g is a set of random variables
and x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
k
), let X = x be an abbreviation for the event X
1
= x
1
\ : : : \X
k
= x
k
.
A random variable is measurable with respect to cps (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) if X = x 2 F for all
x 2 R(X). For the rest of the paper, I assume that all random variables X are measur-
able and that R(X) is nite for all random variables X. Random variables X and Y are
independent with respect to plausibility measure Pl if the events X = x and Y = y are
independent for all x 2 R(X) and y 2 R(Y ). More generally, given sets X, Y, and Z of
random variables, X and Y are plausibilistically independent given Z (with respect to Pl),
denoted I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ), if I
Pl
(X = x;Y = xjZ = z) for all x, y, and z. (Note that I am using
I
Pl
for conditional independence of events and I
rv
Pl
for conditional independence of random
variables.) If Z = ;, then I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) if X and Y are unconditionally independent, that
is, if I
Pl
(X = x;Y = xjW ) for all x, y; if either X = ; or Y = ;, then I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) is taken
to be vacuously true.
Now consider the following four properties of random variables, called the semi-graphoid
properties (Pearl, 1988), where X, Y, and Z are pairwise disjoint sets of variables.
CIRV1. If I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) then I
rv
Pl
(Y;XjZ).
CIRV2. If I
rv
Pl
(X;Y [Y
0
jZ) then I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ).
CIRV3. If I
rv
Pl
(X;Y [Y
0
jZ) then I
rv
Pl
(X;YjY
0
[ Z).
CIRV4. If I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) and I
rv
Pl
(X;Y
0
jY [ Z) then I
rv
Pl
(X;Y [Y
0
jZ).
It is well known that CIRV1{4 hold for probability measures. The following result
generalizes this. The proof is not dicult, although care must be taken to show that the
result depends only on the properties of algebraic cpms.
Theorem 4.5: CIRV1{4 hold for all algebraic cps's.
Proof: See the appendix.
Theorem 4.5, of course, is very dependent on the denition of conditional independence
given here. Other notions of independence have been studied in the literature for specic
representations of uncertainty. Perhaps the most common denition tries to generalize the
observation that if U and V are probabilistically independent, then (U\V ) = (U)(V ).
Zadeh (1978) considered this approach in the context of possibility measures, calling it
noninteraction, but it clearly makes sense for any algebraic cpm.
Denition 4.6: U and V do not interact given V
0
(with respect to the algebraic cpm Pl),
denoted NI
Pl
(U; V jV
0
), if V
0
2 F
0
implies that Pl(U \ V jV
0
) = Pl(U jV
0
)
 Pl(V jV
0
).
8
8. Shenoy (1994) denes a notion similar in spirit to noninteraction for random variables.
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Fonck (1994) shows that noninteraction is strictly weaker than independence for a num-
ber of notions of independence for possibility measures. The following result shows that
independence implies noninteraction for all algebraic cpms.
Lemma 4.7: If (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) is an algebraic cps, then I
Pl
(U; V jV
0
) implies NI
Pl
(U; V jV
0
).
Proof: Suppose that V
0
2 F
0
and I
Pl
(U; V jV
0
) holds. If V \ V
0
2 F
0
then, from Alg2, it
follows that
Pl(U \ V jV
0
) = Pl(U jV \ V
0
)
 Pl(V jV
0
) = Pl(U jV
0
)
 Pl(V jV
0
):
On the other hand, if V \V
0
=2 F
0
, then by Acc4, Pl(V jV
0
) = ?. By CPl3, Pl(U\V jV
0
) = ?,
and by Lemma 3.3, Pl(U jV
0
)
Pl(V jV
0
) = ?. Thus, Pl(U \ V jV
0
) = Pl(U jV
0
)
Pl(V jV
0
).
What about the converse to Lemma 4.7? The results of Fonck show that it does not hold
in general|indeed, it does not hold for Poss(U jV ). So what is required for noninteraction
to imply independence? The following lemma provides a sucient condition.
Lemma 4.8: If (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) is a standard algebraic cps that satises Alg4
0
, then NI
Pl
(U; V jV
0
)
implies I
Pl
(U; V jV
0
).
Proof: Suppose that V \ V
0
2 F
0
and NI
Pl
(U; V jV
0
). Then by Alg2,
Pl(U \ V jV
0
) = Pl(U jV \ V
0
)
 Pl(V jV
0
): (2)
By Acc3, V
0
2 F
0
, so NI
Pl
(U; V jV
0
) implies
Pl(U \ V jV
0
) = Pl(U jV
0
)
 Pl(V jV
0
): (3)
Since V \ V
0
2 F
0
and (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) is standard, Pl(V \ V
0
) 6= ?. Since Pl(V \ V
0
) =
Pl(V jV
0
) 
 Pl(V
0
), it follows from Lemma 3.4 that Pl(V jV
0
) 6= ?. So, by Alg4
0
, (2),
and (3), it follows that Pl(U jV \ V
0
) = Pl(U jV
0
). An identical argument shows that
Pl(V jU \ V
0
) = Pl(V jV
0
) if U \ V
0
2 F
0
. Thus, I
Pl
(U; V jV
0
).
Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8 show why noninteraction and independence coincide for conditional
probability dened from unconditional probability, ranking functions, and possibility mea-
sures using Poss(U jjV ). Moreover, they suggest why they do not coincide in general. Since
neither Poss(U jV ) nor Pl
P
satisfy Alg4
0
, it is perhaps not surprising that in neither case
does noninteraction imply conditional independence. (We shall shortly see an example in
the case of Pl
P
; Fonck (1994) gives examples in the case of Poss(U jV ).) Indeed, noninterac-
tion may not even imply conditional independence for an arbitrary conditional probability
measure, as the following example shows.
Example 4.9: Suppose that W = fa; bg, F = 2
W
, F
0
= F   f;g, (a) = 1, (b) = 0, but
(bjb) = 1. It is easy to see that fbg is not independent of itself, but fbg does not interact
with fbg, since (b) = (b)(b). Nevertheless, it is not hard to check that this conditional
probability measure  is algebraic and, in fact, satises Alg4
0
. However, it is not standard,
since fbg 2 F
0
although (b) = 0.
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It is easy to see that the assumption of standardness is necessary in Lemma 4.8. For
suppose that (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) is an arbitrary nonstandard algebraic cps for which > 6= ?.
Since (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) is nonstandard, there must exist some U 2 F
0
such that Pl(U jW ) = ?.
But then
? = Pl(;jW ) = Pl(;jU) 
 Pl(U jW ) = ?
?:
Thus
Pl(U jW ) = ? = ?
? = Pl(U jW )
 Pl(U jW );
so NI
Pl
(U;U jW ). But Pl(U jU) = > 6= ? = Pl(U), so I
Pl
(U;U jW ) does not hold.
In general, Theorem 4.5 does not hold if we use NI
Pl
rather than I
Pl
. That is, Alg1{4
do not suce to ensure that CIRV1{4 hold for NI
Pl
. Besides noninteraction, a number of
dierent approaches to dening independence for possibility measures (Campos & Huete,
1999a, 1999b; Dubois, Fari~nas del Cerro, Herzig, & Prade, 1994; Fonck, 1994) and for sets
of probability measures (Campos & Huete, 1993; Campos & Moral, 1995; Cousa et al.,
1999) have been considered. In general, Theorem 4.5 does not hold for them either. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss and compare these approaches to that considered
here, but it is instructive to consider independence for sets of probability measures in a
little more detail, especially for the representation Pl
P
.
De Campos and Moral (1995) dene what the call type-1 independence. U and V
are type-1 independent conditional on V
0
with respect to P if U and V are independent
conditional on V
0
with respect to every  2 P. It is easy to check that type-1 independence
is equivalent to noninteraction in the context of sets of probability measures. Thus, by
Lemma 4.7, I
Pl
P
(U; V jV
0
) implies that U and V are type-1 independent conditional on
V
0
(and similarly for random variables). However, the converse does not necessarily hold,
because the two approaches treat conditioning on events that have probability 0 according
to some (but not all) of the measures in P dierently. To see this, consider an example
discussed by de Campos and Moral. Suppose a coin is known to be either double-headed or
double-tailed and is tossed twice. This can be represented by P = f
0
; 
1
g, where 
0
(hh) =
1 and 
0
(ht) = 
0
(th) = 
0
(tt) = 0, while 
1
(tt) = 1 and 
1
(ht) = 
1
(th) = 
1
(hh) = 0.
Let X
1
and X
2
be the random variables representing the outcome of the rst and second
coin tosses, respectively. Clearly there is a functional dependence between X
1
and X
2
, but
it is easy to check that X
1
and X
2
are type-1 independent with respect to P. Moreover,
noninteraction holds: NI
Pl
(X
1
= i;X
2
= j) holds for i; j 2 fh; tg. On the other hand,
I
Pl
P
(X
1
;X
2
) does not hold. For example, f
X
1
=h
(1) = 0 while f
X
1
=hjX
2
=h
(1) = .
9
The dierence between noninteraction (i.e., type-1 independence) and the denition of
independence used in this paper in the context of sets of probability measures can be sum-
marized as follows. U and V do not interact with respect to P if U and V are independent
9. As Peter Walley [private communication, 2000] points out, this example is somewhat misleading. The
denition of independence with respect to Pl
P
produces the same counterintuitive behavior as type-1
independence if the probabilities are modied slightly so as to make them positive, i.e., when there is
\almost functional dependence" between the two variables. For example, suppose that the coin in the
example is known to either land heads with probability :99 or :01 (rather than 1 and 0, as in the example).
Let 
0
0
and 
0
1
be the obvious modications of 
0
and 
1
required to represent this situation, and let
P
0
= f
0
0
; 
0
1
g. It is easy to check that X
1
and X
2
continue to be type-1 independent, and noninteraction
continues to hold, but now I
Pl
P
0
(X
1
; X
2
) also holds. The real problem is that this representation of
uncertainty does not enable learning.
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with respect to all measures  2 P. On the other hand, U and V are independent with
respect to P if (1) U and V are independent for all measures  2 P such that (U) > 0 and
(V ) > 0 and (2) (U) = 0 i (V ) = 0 for all  2 P. The denition of independence used
here is thus more restrictive; it does not ignore the measures that give U or V probability 0
when determining independence. The dierence between the two approaches is illustrated
in the example in the previous paragraph.
As the variant of the example considered in Footnote 9 shows though, neither denition
can completely claim to represent the intuition that if U is independent of V , then learning
U gives no information about V . If the coin in the example is known to land heads with
probability either .99 or .01, then seeing the rst coin toss land heads certainly seems to
give information about the second coin toss, even though both denitions would declare
the events independent. However, the denition of independence used here does have the
advantage of leading to an algebraic cps, which means, as is shown in the next section, that
using it leads to a representation of sets of probability measures that can be represented as
a Bayesian network.
5. Bayesian Networks
Throughout this section, I assume that we start with a setW of possible worlds characterized
by a set X = fX
1
; : : : ;X
n
g of n binary random variables. That is, a world in W is a tuple
(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) with x
i
2 f0; 1g, and X
i
(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) = x
i
; that is, the value of X
i
in world
w = (x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) = w
i
.
10
The goal of this section is to show that many of the tools of
Bayesian network technology can be applied in this setting. The proofs of the main results
all proceed in essentially the same spirit as well-known results for probabilistic Bayesian
networks (see (Geiger & Pearl, 1988; Geiger et al., 1990; Verma, 1986)).
5.1 Qualitative Bayesian Networks
As usual, a (qualitative) Bayesian network (over X ) is a dag whose nodes are labeled by
variables in X . The standard notion of a Bayesian network representing a probability
measure (Pearl, 1988) can be generalized in the obvious way to plausibility.
Denition 5.1: Given a qualitative Bayesian network G, let Par
G
(X) be the parents of the
random variable X in G; let Des
G
(X) be all the descendants of X, that is, X and all those
nodes Y such that X is an ancestor of Y ; let ND
G
(X), the nondescendants of X, consist
of X   Des
G
(X). Note that all ancestors of X are nondescendants of X. The Bayesian
network G is compatible with the cps (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) (or just compatible with Pl, if the other
components of the cps are clear from context) if I
rv
Pl
(X;ND
G
(X)jPar(X)), that is, if X is
conditionally independent of its nondescendants given its parents, for all X 2 X .
There is a standard way of constructing a Bayesian network that represents a proba-
bility measure (Pearl, 1988). I briey review the construction here, since it works without
change for an algebraic cpm. Given an algebraic cpm Pl, let Y
1
; : : : ; Y
n
be a permuta-
tion of the random variables in X . Construct a qualitative Bayesian network G
Pl;hY
1
;:::;Y
n
i
10. The assumption that the random variables are binary is just for ease of exposition. It is easy to generalize
the results to the case where R(X
i
) is nite for each X
i
; there is no need to assume that R(X
i
) is a
subset of the reals.
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as follows: For each k, nd a minimal subset of fY
1
; : : : ; Y
k 1
g, call it P
k
, such that
I
rv
Pl
(fY
1
; : : : ; Y
k 1
g; Y
k
jP
k
). Then add edges from each of the nodes in P
k
to Y
k
. Verma
(1986) shows that this construction gives a Bayesian network that is compatible with Pl in
the case that Pl is a probability measure; his proof depends only on CIRV1{4. Thus, the
construction works for algebraic cpms.
Theorem 5.2: G
Pl;hY
1
;:::;Y
n
i
is compatible with Pl.
Proof: For ease of notation in the proof, I write G instead of G
Pl;hY
1
;:::;Y
n
i
. Note that
Y
1
; : : : ; Y
n
represents a topological sort of G; edges always go from nodes in fY
1
; : : : ; Y
k 1
g
to Y
k
. It follows that G is acyclic; i.e., it is a dag. The construction guarantees that
P
k
= Par
G
(Y
k
) and that I
rv
Pl
(fY
1
; : : : ; Y
k 1
g; Y
k
jPar
G
(Y
k
)). It follows from results of (Verma,
1986) (and is not hard to verify directly) that I
rv
Pl
(ND
G
(Y
k
); Y
k
jPar
G
(Y
k
)) can be proved
using only CIRV1{4. The result now follows from Theorem 4.5.
5.2 Quantitative Bayesian Networks
A qualitative Bayesian network G gives qualitative information about dependence and inde-
pendence, but does not actually give the values of the conditional plausibilities. To provide
the more quantitative information, we associate with each node X in G a conditional plau-
sibility table (cpt) that quanties the eects of the parents of X on X. A cpt for X gives,
for each setting of X's parents in G, the plausibility that X = 0 and X = 1 given that
setting. For example, if X's parents in G are Y and Z, then the cpt for X would have an
entry denoted d
X=ijY=j\Z=k
for all (i; j; k) 2 f0; 1g
3
. As the notation is meant to suggest,
d
X=ijY=j\Z=k
= Pl(X = ijY = j \ Z = k) for the plausibility measure Pl represented by
G.
11
For each xed j and k, we assume that x
0jk
 x
1jk
= >. A quantitative Bayesian
network is a pair (G; f) consisting of a qualitative Bayesian network G and a function f
that associates with each node X in G a cpt for X.
Denition 5.3: A quantitative Bayesian network (G; f) represents Pl if G is compatible
with Pl and the cpts agree with Pl, in the sense that, for each random variable X, the entry
d
X=ijY
1
=j
1
;:::;Y
k
=j
k
in the cpt is Pl(X = ijY
1
= j
1
\: : :\Y
k
= j
k
) if Y
1
= j
1
\: : :\Y
k
= j
k
2 F
0
.
(It does not matter what d
X=ijY
1
=j
1
;:::;Y
k
=j
k
is if Y
1
= j
1
\ : : : \ Y
k
= j
k
=2 F
0
.)
Given a cpm Pl, it is easy to construct a quantitative Bayesian network (G; f) that
represents Pl: simply construct G that is compatible with Pl as in Theorem 5.2 and dene
f appropriately, using Pl. The more interesting question is whether there is a unique
algebraic cpm determined by a quantitative Bayesian network. As stated, this question is
somewhat undetermined. The numbers in a quantitative network do not say what  and

 ought to be for the algebraic cpm.
A reasonable way to make the question more interesting is the following. Recall that,
for the purposes of this section, I have taken W to consist of the 2
n
worlds characterized by
the n binary random variables in X . Let PL
D;;

consist of all standard cps's of the form
(W;F ;F
0
;Pl), where F = 2
W
, so that all subsets of W are measurable, the range of Pl is
11. Of course, if the random variables are not binary, i; j; k have to range over all possible values for the
random variables.
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D, and Pl is algebraic with respect to  and 
. Thus, for example, PL
IN

;min;+
consists
of all conditional ranking functions on W dened from unconditional ranking functions by
the construction in Section 2. Since a cps (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) 2 PL
D;;

is determined by Pl, I
often abuse notation and write Pl 2 PL
D;;

.
With this notation, the question becomes whether a quantitative Bayesian network
(G; f) such that the entries in the cpts are inD determines a unique element in PL
D;;

. As
I now show, the answer is yes, provided (D;;
) satises some conditions. Characterizing
the conditions on (D;;
) required for this result turns out to be a little subtle. Indeed,
it is somewhat surprising how many assumptions are required to reproduce the simple
arguments that are required in the case of probability.
Denition 5.4: (D;;
) is a BN-compatible domain (with respect to PL
D;;

) if there
are sets D(
)  D D and D()  D [D
2
[D
3
[ : : : satisfying the following properties:
BN1.  and 
 are commutative and associative.
BN2. For all d 2 D, (>; d); (?; d) 2 D(
), (?; d) 2 D(), > 
 d = d, ? 
 d = ?, and
? d = d.
BN3. 
 distributes over ; more precisely, a
 (b
1
     b
n
) = (a
 b
1
)     (a
 b
n
) if
(a; b
1
); : : : ; (a; b
n
); (a; b
1
  b
n
) 2 D(
) and (b
1
; : : : ; b
n
); (a
b
1
; : : : ; a
b
n
) 2 D();
moreover, (a
1
  a
n
)
 b = a
1

 b  a
n

 b if (a
1
; : : : ; a
n
); (a
1

 b; : : : ; a
n

 b) 2
D() and (a
1
     a
n
; b); (a
1
; b); : : : ; (a
n
; b) 2 D(
).
BN4. If (a; c); (b; c) 2 D(
), a
 c  b
 c, and c 6= ?, then a  b.
BN5. If (d
1
; : : : ; d
k
) 2 D() and d
1
     d
k
 d, then there exists (d
0
1
; : : : ; d
0
k
) 2 D()
such that (d
0
1
; d); : : : ; (d
0
k
; d); (d
0
1
     d
0
k
; d) 2 D(
), d
i
= d
0
i

 d, for i = 1; : : : ; k,
and d
1
    d
k
= (d
0
1
     d
0
k
)
 d.
BN6. D() is closed under permutations and prexes, so that if (x
1
; : : : ; x
k
) 2 D() and
 is a permutation of (1; : : : ; k), then (x
(1)
; : : : ; x
(k)
) 2 D() and if k
0
 k, then
(x
1
; : : : ; x
k
0
) 2 D(); moreover D()  D.
BN7. If (d
1
; : : : ; d
k
); (d
0
1
; : : : ; d
0
m
) 2 D(), (d
i
; d
0
j
) 2 D(
) for i = 1; : : : ; k, j = 1; : : : ;m,
then (d
1

 d
0
1
; : : : ; d
1

 d
0
m
; : : : ; d
k

 d
0
1
; : : : ; d
k

 d
0
m
) 2 D().
BN8. If (d
1
; : : : ; d
k
) 2 D() and k
0
 k, then d
1
     d
k
0
 d
1
     d
k
.
Note that all the representations of uncertainty we have considered so far have associated
with them BN-compatible domains. Indeed, the denitions of D(), D(
), , and 
 in
each case are given in the proof of Proposition 3.2. For example, for PL
[0;1];max;min
, the
set of conditional possibility measures determined by unconditional possibility measures,
D() = [0; 1]  [0; 1], while D(
) consists of all pairs (a; b) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1] such that a < b
or a = 1. I leave it to the reader to check that, in all these cases, BN1{8 hold.
Given a tuple x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) 2 [0; 1]
n
, let d
X
i
;G;x
denote the value d
X
i
=x
i
jPar
G
(X
i
)=y
,
where y is the restriction of x to the variables in Par
G
(X
i
).
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Denition 5.5: If (D;;
) is BN-compatible, then a quantitative Bayesian network (G; f)
is (D;;
)-representable if the values of the cpts for G lie in D and the following properties
hold:
R1. For every nodeX inG and every setting y of Par
G
(X), (d
X=0jPar
G
(X)=y
; d
X=1jPar
G
(X)=y
) 2
Dom() and
d
X=0jPar
G
(X)=y
 d
X=1jPar
G
(X)=y
= >:
R2. Suppose Y
1
; : : : ; Y
n
is a topological sort of the nodes in G. Then for all y 2 f0; 1g
n
and all 1  j < k  n, (d
Y
j
;G;y
; d
Y
j+1
;G;y

    
 d
Y
k
;G;y
) 2 D(
) and (d
Y
j
;G;y

    

d
Y
k 1
;G;y
; d
Y
k
;G;y
) 2 D(
).
R1 is the obvious analogue of the requirement in the probabilistic case that the entries
of the cpt for X, for a xed setting of X's parents, add up to 1. R2 essentially says that
certain terms (the ones required to compute the plausibility of Y = y for Y = hY
1
; : : : ; Y
n
i)
are required to be in D(
), so that it makes sense to take their product. Since D(
) =
[0; 1]  [0; 1] in the case of probability, there is no need to make this requirement explicit.
However, it is necessary for other representations of uncertainty.
The following result shows that, as the name suggests, there is a unique cpm that
represents a representable quantitative Bayesian network.
Theorem 5.6 : If (G; f) is (D;;
)-representable, then there is a unique cpm Pl 2
PL
D;;

such that (G; f) represents Pl.
5.3 D-Separation
Just as in the case of probability, conditional independencies can be read o the Bayesian
network using the criterion of d-separation (Pearl, 1988). Recall that a set X of nodes
in G = (V;E), is d-separated from a set Y of nodes by a set Z of nodes in G, written
d-sep
G
(X;YjZ), if, for every X 2 X, Y 2 Y, and a trail from X to Y (that is, a sequence
(X
0
; : : : ;X
k
) of nodes in G such that X
0
= X, X
k
= Y and either (X
i
;X
i+1
) or (X
i+1
;X
i
)
is a directed edge in G) and a node X
i
on the trail with 0 < i < k such that either:
(a) X
i
2 Z and there is an arrow leading into X
i
and an arrow leading out (i.e., either
(X
i 1
;X
i
); (X
i
;X
i+1
) 2 E or (X
i
;X
i 1
); (X
i+1
;X
i
) 2 E
(b) X
i
2 Z and X
i
is a tail-to-tail node (i.e., (X
i
;X
i 1
); (X
i
;X
i+1
) 2 E)
(c) X
i
is a head to head node (i.e., (X
i 1
;X
i
); (X
i+1
;X
i
) 2 E), and neither X
i
nor any
of its descendants are in Z.
Let 
G;Pl
consist of all statements of the form I
rv
Pl
(X;ND
G
(X)jPar
G
(X)). Let PL
D;;

be an arbitrary collection of cps's of the form (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) where all components other
than Pl are xed, and the plausibility measures Pl all have the same range D of plausibility
values. Consider the following three statements:
1. d-sep
G
(X;YjZ).
2. I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) is provable from CIRV1{4 and 
G;Pl
.
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3. I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) holds for every plausibility measure in PL
D;;

compatible with G.
The implication from 1 to 2 is proved in (Geiger et al., 1990; Verma, 1986).
Theorem 5.7: (Geiger et al., 1990; Verma, 1986) If d-sep
G
(X;YjZ), then I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) is
provable from CIRV1{4 and 
G;Pl
.
It is immediate from Theorem 4.5 that the implication from 2 to 3 holds for algebraic
cpms.
Corollary 5.8: If I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) is provable from CIRV1{4 and 
G;Pl
, then I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ)
holds for every algebraic cpm Pl compatible with G.
Finally, the implication from 3 to 1 for probability measures is proved in (Geiger & Pearl,
1988; Geiger et al., 1990). Here I generalize the proof to algebraic plausibility measures.
Notice that to prove the implication from 3 to 1, it suces to show that if X is not d-
separated from Y by Z in G, then there is a plausibility measure Pl 2 PL
D;;

such that
I
rv
Pl
(X;Y jZ) does not hold. To guarantee that such a plausibility measure exists in PL
D;;

,
we have to ensure that there are \enough" plausibility measures in PL
D;;

in the following
technical sense.
Denition 5.9: A BN-compatible domain (D;;
) is rich if there exist d; d
0
2 D such
that (1) (d; d
0
) 2 D(), (2) d d
0
= > and (3) if x = x
1

 : : :
 x
k
, where each x
i
is either
d or d
0
and k < n, then (d; x), (x; d), (d
0
; x), and (x; d
0
) are all in D(
) (intuitively, D(
)
contains all products involving d and d
0
of length at most n).
All the domains for the cps's we have considered are easily seen to be rich.
Theorem 5.10: Suppose that plausibility measures in PL
D;;

take values in a rich BN-
compatible domain. Then if I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) holds for every plausibility measure in PL
D;;

compatible with G, then d-sep
G
(X;YjZ).
I remark that independence and d-separation for various approaches to representing sets
of probability measures using Bayesian networks are discussed by Cozman (2000b, 2000a).
However, the technical details are quite dierent from the approach taken here.
6. Conclusion
I have considered a general notion of conditional plausibility that generalizes all other stan-
dard notions of conditioning in the literature, and examined various requirements that
could be imposed on conditional plausibility. One set of requirements, those that lead to
algebraic cps's, was shown to suce for the construction of Bayesian networks. Further
assuming that the range D of the plausibility measure is a BN-compatible domain suces
for all the more quantitative properties of Bayesian networks to hold and for d-separation
to characterize the independencies. It should also be clear that standard constructions like
belief propagation in Bayesian networks (Pearl, 1988) can also be applied to algebraic cps's
with ranges that are BN-compatible, since they typically use only basic properties of con-
ditioning, addition, and multiplication, all of which hold in BN-compatible domains (using
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 and 
). In particular, these results apply to sets to probability measures, provided that
they are appropriately represented as plausibility measures. The particular representation
of sets of probability measures advocated in this paper was also shown to have a number of
other attractive properties.
The results of this paper show that Alg1{4 are sucient conditions for representing
a measure of uncertainty that is acceptable as a Bayesian network. They may not be
necessary. It would be interesting to see if other natural conditions also suce. Similarly, I
have focused only on acceptable cps's, that is, ones that satisfy Acc1{4. Acc3 and Acc4 are
nontrivial conditions; it would be of interest to see to what extent they could be weakened
while still being able to prove results in the spirit of this paper. I leave these questions to
future research.
Appendix A. Proofs
In this section I give the proofs of Theorems 4.5, 5.6, and 5.10. I repeat the statement of
the results for the convenience of the reader.
Lemma A.1: Suppose that (W;F ;F
0
;Pl) is a cps, A
1
; : : : ; A
n
is a partition ofW , X;A
1
; : : : ; A
n
2
F , and Y 2 F
0
. Then
Pl(XjY ) = 
fi:A
i
\Y 2F
0
g
Pl(XjA
i
\ Y )
 Pl(A
i
jY ):
12
Proof: Using an easy induction argument, it follows from Alg1 that
Pl(XjY ) = 
n
i=1
Pl(X \A
i
jY ):
If A
i
\Y =2 F
0
, then it follows from Acc4 that Pl(A
i
jY ) = ?. Thus, by CPl3, Pl(X\A
i
jY ) =
?. Using Lemma 3.3, it follows that
Pl(XjY ) = 
fi:A
i
\Y 2F
0
g
Pl(X \A
i
jY ):
If A
i
\ Y 2 F
0
, then it follows from Alg2 that Pl(X \ A
i
jY ) = Pl(XjA
i
\ Y ) 
 Pl(A
i
jY ).
Thus,
Pl(XjY ) = 
fi:A
i
\Y 2F
0
g
Pl(XjA
i
\ Y )
 Pl(A
i
jY );
as desired.
Theorem 4.5: CIRV1{4 hold for all algebraic cps's.
Proof: CIRV1 is immediate from the fact that independence is symmetric.
For CIRV2, suppose that I
rv
Pl
(X;Y [Y
0
jZ). We must show I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ). That is, we
must show that I
Pl
(X = x;Y = yjZ = z), for all x, y, and z. This requires showing two
things.
12. Notice that if A
i
\ Y 2 F
0
, then Pl(XjA
i
\ Y ) 
 Pl(A
i
jY ) = Pl(X \ A
i
jY ) by Alg2. Thus, the terms
arising on the right-hand side of the equation in Lemma A.1 are in Dom(). This means that there is
no need to put in parentheses;  is associative on terms in Dom().
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2(a). If X = x \ Z = z 2 F
0
, then
Pl(Y = yjX = x \ Z = z) = Pl(Y = yjZ = z):
2(b). If Y = y \ Z = z 2 F
0
, then
Pl(X = xjY = y \ Z = z) = Pl(X = xjZ = z):
For 2(a), suppose that Pl(X = x \ Z = z) 2 F
0
. From I
Pl
(X;Y [ Y
0
jZ), it follows that
I
Pl
(X = x;Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z) for all y
0
. Hence
Pl(Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jX = x \ Z = z) = Pl(Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z) (4)
for all y
0
2 R(Y
0
). From (4) it follows that

y
0
Pl(Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jX = x \ Z = z) = 
y
0
Pl(Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z):
Thus,
Pl([
y
0
Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jX = x \ Z = z) = Pl([
y
0
Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z):
Since [
y
0
(Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
) = Y = y, 2(a) holds.
For 2(b), from I
rv
Pl
(X;Y [Y
0
jZ), it follows that if Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
\Z = z 2 F
0
, then
Pl(X = xjY = y \Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z) = Pl(X = xjZ = z): (5)
From (5) and Lemma A.1, it follows that
Pl(X = xjY = y \ Z = z)
= 
fy
0
:Y=y\Y
0
=y
0
\Z=z2F
0
g
Pl(X = xjY = y \Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z)
 Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \ Z = z)
= 
fy
0
:Y=y\Y
0
=y
0
\Z=z2F
0
g
Pl(X = xjZ = z)
 Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \ Z = z):
(6)
By Acc4, it follows that if Y = y \ Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z =2 F
0
, then Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \
Z = z) = ?. Thus, by Lemma 3.3, Alg1, CPl2, and CPl4,

fy
0
:Y=y\Y
0
=y
0
\Z=z2F
0
g
Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \ Z = z)
= 
y
0
Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \ Z = z)
= Pl(W jY = y \ Z = z)
= >:
(7)
The next step is to apply distributivity (Alg3) to the last line of (6). To do this, we
must show that certain tuples are in Dom() and Dom(
), respectively. Since
(Pl(X = xjY = y \Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z);Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \ Z = z) 2 Dom(
);
from (5) it follows that
(Pl(X = xjZ = z);Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \Z = z)) 2 Dom(
):
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If fy
0
i
1
; : : : ;y
0
i
k
g = fy
0
2 R(Y
0
) : Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z 2 F
0
g, then clearly
(Pl(Y
0
= y
0
i
1
jY = y \Z = z); : : : ;Pl(Y
0
= y
0
i
k
jY = y \ Z = z) 2 Dom():
Moreover, using (5) again and Alg2, it follows that
Pl(X = xjZ = z)
 Pl(Y
0
= y
0
i
k
jY = y \ Z = z) = Pl(X = x \Y
0
= y
0
i
k
jY = y \ Z = z):
Thus, (Pl(X = xjZ = z)
Pl(Y
0
= y
0
i
1
jY = y\Z = z); : : : ;Pl(X = xjZ = z)
Pl(Y
0
= y
0
i
k
jY = y\
Z = z) 2 Dom(). Finally, since (7) shows that 
fy
0
:Y=y\Y
0
=y
0
\Z=z2F
0
g
= > and, by the
proof of Lemma 3.4, (d;>) 2 Dom(
) for all d 2 Range(Pl), it follows that
(Pl(XjZ = z);
fy
0
:Y=y\Y
0
=y
0
\Z=z2F
0
g
Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \ Z = z)) 2 Dom(
):
It now follows, using Alg3, (7), and Lemma 3.4, that

fy
0
:Y=y\Y
0
=y
0
\Z=z2F
0
g
Pl(X = xjZ = z)
 Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \ Z = z)
= Pl(X = xjZ = z)
 (
fy
0
:Y=y\Y
0
=y
0
\Z=z2F
0
g
Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \ Z = z))
= Pl(X = xjZ = z)
>
= Pl(X = xjZ = z):
Thus, from (6), it follows that Pl(X = xjY = y \ Z = z) = Pl(X = xjZ = z). This com-
pletes the proof of 2(b) and CIRV2.
For CIRV3, suppose that I
rv
Pl
(X;Y[Y
0
jZ). We must show that I
rv
Pl
(X;YjY
0
[Z). This
again requires showing two things:
3(a). If X = x \Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z 2 F
0
, then
Pl(Y = yjX = x \Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z) = Pl(Y = yjY
0
= y
0
\ Z = z):
3(b). If Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z 2 F
0
, then
Pl(X = xjY = y \Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z) = Pl(X = xjY
0
= y
0
\ Z = z):
For 3(a), suppose thatX = x\Y
0
= y
0
\Z = z 2 F
0
. Thus, by Acc3, X = x\Z = z 2 F
0
.
Since I
rv
Pl
(X;Y [Y
0
jZ), it follows that
Pl(Y = y
00
\Y
0
= y
0
jX = x \ Z = z) = Pl(Y = y
00
\Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z) (8)
for all y
00
2 R(Y). Applying Alg2 to each side of (8), it follows that
Pl(Y = yjY
0
= y
0
\X = x \ Z = z)
 Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jX = x \ Z = z)
= Pl(Y = yjY
0
= y
0
\ Z = z)
 Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z):
Thus, to prove 3(a), it follows from Alg4 that it suces to show that
Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jX = x \ Z = z) = Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z) 6= ?:
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But by (8) and Alg1, it follows that
Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jX = x \ Z = z)
= 
y
00
2R(Y)
Pl(Y = y
00
\Y
0
= y
0
jX = x \ Z = z)
= 
y
00
2R(Y)
Pl(Y = y
00
\Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z)
= Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z);
as desired. Moreover, since X = x \ Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z 2 F
0
, it follows from Acc4 that
Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z) 6= ?.
For 3(b), suppose that Y = y\Y
0
= y
0
\Z = z 2 F
0
. Since I
rv
Pl
(X;Y[Y
0
jZ), it follows
that
Pl(X = xjY = y \Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z) = Pl(X = xjZ = z):
Thus, to prove 3(b), it suces to show that
Pl(X = xjY
0
= y
0
\Z = z) = Pl(X = xjZ = z): (9)
Recall that we are assuming that I
rv
Pl
(X;Y[Y
0
jZ). By CIRV2, it follows that I
rv
Pl
(X;Y
0
jZ).
Thus, (9) is immediate from 2(b) (since Y = y\Y
0
= y
0
\Z = z 2 F
0
implies that Y
0
= y
0
\
Z = z 2 F
0
).
Finally, consider CIRV4. Suppose that I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) and I
rv
Pl
(X;Y
0
jY [ Z). We must
show that I
rv
Pl
(X;Y [Y
0
jZ). As usual, this requires showing two things:
4(a). If Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z 2 F
0
, then
Pl(X = xjY = y \Y
0
= y
0
\ Z = z) = Pl(X = xjZ = z):
4(b). If X = x \ Z = z 2 F
0
, then
Pl(Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jX = x \ Z = z) = Pl(Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z):
Both 4(a) and 4(b) are straightforward. For 4(a), suppose thatY = y\Y
0
= y
0
\Z = z 2
F
0
. Since I
rv
Pl
(X;Y
0
jY [ Z), it follows that
Pl(X = xjY = y \Y
0
= y
0
\Z = z) = Pl(X = xjY = y \ Z = z):
And since I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ), it follows that
Pl(X = xjY = y \ Z = z) = Pl(X = xjZ = z):
Thus we have 4(a).
For 4(b), suppose that X = x \ Z = z 2 F
0
. There are now two cases to consider. If
Pl(Y = yjX = x \Z = z) 6= ? then, by Acc4, X = x \Y = y \ Z = z 2 F
0
. Moreover, by
Alg2,
Pl(Y = y\Y
0
= y
0
jX = x\Z = z) = Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jX = x\Y = y\Z = z)
Pl(Y = yjX = x\Z = z):
(10)
Since I
rv
Pl
(X;Y
0
jY [ Z), it follows that
Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jX = x \Y = y \ Z = z) = Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \ Z = z):
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And since I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ), it follows that Pl(Y = yjX = x\Z = z) = Pl(Y = yjZ = z). Plug-
ging this into (10) and applying Alg2 again gives
Pl(Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jX = x \Z = z)
= Pl(Y
0
= y
0
jY = y \ Z = z)
 Pl(Y = yjZ = z)
= Pl(Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z);
as desired.
Now if Pl(Y = yjX = x \ Z = z) = ?, then by CPl3, it follows that Pl(Y = y \
Y
0
= y
0
jX = x\Z = z) = ?. Moreover, since I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ), it follows that Pl(Y = yjZ = z) =
?. Applying CPl3, we get that Pl(Y = y \Y
0
= y
0
jZ = z) = ?. Thus, again 4(b) holds.
Theorem 5.6: If (G; f) is (D;;
)-representable then there is a unique cpm Pl 2
PL
D;;

such that (G; f) represents Pl.
Proof: Given (G; f), suppose without loss of generality that X = hX
1
; : : : ;X
n
i is a topo-
logical sort of the nodes in G. I now dene the plausibility measure Pl determined by (G; f).
I start by dening Pl
(G;f)
on sets of the form X = x.
It easily follows from Alg2 that if Pl 2 PL
D;;

and Pl(X
1
= x
1
\ : : :\X
n 1
= x
n 1
) 6=
?, then
Pl(X = x) = Pl(X
n
= x
n
jX
1
= x
1
\ : : : \X
n 1
= x
n 1
)

Pl(X
n 1
= x
n 1
jX
1
= x
1
\ : : : \X
n 2
= x
n 2
)

   
 Pl(X
2
= x
2
jX
1
= x
1
)
 Pl(X
1
= x
1
):
(11)
Thus, an algebraic plausibility measure satises an analogue of the chain rule for probability.
(Since 
 in D is assumed to be associative, no parentheses are required here. However, even
without this assumption, it follows easily from Alg2 that 
 is in fact associative on tuples
(a; b; c) of the form (Pl(U
1
jU
2
);Pl(U
2
jU
3
);Pl(U
3
jU
4
)), where U
1
 U
2
 U
3
 U
4
, which are
the only types of tuples that arise in (11). Associativity will be more of an issue below.)
If Pl is compatible with G, then in fact
Pl(X = x) = Pl(X
n
= x
n
j \
X
j
2Par
G
(X
n
)
X
j
= x
j
)

Pl(X
n 1
= x
n 1
j \
X
j
2Par
G
(X
n
 1)
X
j
= x
j
)

   
 (X
1
= x
1
):
(12)
(If Par
G
(X
k
) = ;, then Pl(X
k
= x
k
j\
X
j
2Par
G
(X
k
)
X
j
= x
j
) is just taken to be Pl(X
k
= x
k
).)
It is clear from (12) that Pl
(G;f)
(X = x) must be d
X
n
;G;x

    
 d
X
1
;G;x
.
Note that every subset of W can be written as a disjoint union of events of the form
X = x. Thus, if U 2 F , dene
Pl
(G;f)
(U) = 
fx:X=xUg
d
X
n
;G;x

    
 d
X
1
;G;x
:
For conditional plausibilities, suppose that Pl
(G;f)
(V ) 6= ?, so that V 2 F
0
. Let
fx
1
; : : : ;x
k
g = fx : X = x  V g. It follows easily from BN6, BN7, R1, and R2 that
(Pl
(G;f)
(X = x
1
); : : : ;Pl
(G;f)
(X = x
k
)) 2 D(). Thus, by BN8, if X = x  V , then
Pl
(G;f)
(X = x)  Pl
(G;f)
(V ). By BN5, for each j, there exists d
X=x
j
jV
such that
(d
X=x
j
jV
;Pl
(G;f)
(V )) 2 D(
) and d
X=x
j
jV

 Pl
(G;f)
(V ) = Pl
(G;f)
(X = x);
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it follows from BN4 that d
X=x
j
jV
is the unique element in D with this property. Moreover,
by BN5, (d
X=x
1
jV
; : : : ; d
X=x
k
jV
) 2 D(). Dene Pl
(G;f)
(U jV ) = 
fx:X=xU\V g
d
X=xjV
(where Pl
(G;f)
(;jV ) is taken to be ?). Note for future reference that it follows from BN5
that (Pl
(G;f)
(U jV );Pl
(G;f)
(V )) 2 D(
) and
Pl
(G;f)
(U jV )
 Pl
(G;f)
(V ) = Pl
(G;f)
(U \ V ): (13)
This completes the denition of Pl
(G;f)
. It remains to check that it is an algebraic cpm
that is represented by (G; f). Thus, we must check that Alg1{4 and CPl1{4 hold. Alg1
is immediate from the denitions and BN1 and BN2 (BN2 is necessary for the case that
one of the disjoint sets is empty); Alg3 is immediate from BN3 and Alg4 is immediate
from BN4. For Alg2, note that if Pl
(G;f)
(V ) 6= ? and Pl
(G;f)
(V
0
) 6= ? then, by (13),
Pl
(G;f)
(U \ V jV
0
)
 Pl
(G;f)
(V
0
) = Pl
(G;f)
(U \ V \ V
0
) and
(Pl
(G;f
)(U jV \ V
0
)
 Pl
(G;f)
(V jV
0
))
 Pl
(G;f)
(V
0
)
= Pl
(G;f
)(U jV \ V
0
)
 (Pl
(G;f)
(V jV
0
)
 Pl
(G;f)
(V
0
))
= Pl
(G;f)
(U jV \ V
0
)
 Pl
(G;f)
(V \ V
0
)
= Pl
(G;f)
(U \ V \ V
0
):
(Note that the associativity of 
 is being used here.) Thus, by BN4,
Pl
(G;f)
(U \ V jV
0
) = Pl
(G;f
)(U jV \ V
0
)
 Pl
(G;f)
(V jV
0
):
CPl1 is immediate by denition (the empty sum is taken to be ?). For CPl2, note that
by (13), Pl
(G;f)
(W jV ) 
 Pl
(G;f)
(V ) = Pl
(G;f)
(V ). Since > 
 Pl
(G;f)
(V ) = Pl
(G;f)
(V ) by
BN2, it follows from BN4 that Pl
(G;f)
(W jV ) = >. CPl3 follows readily from the denitions
together with BN1, BN6, and BN7. CPl4 also follows by denition.
Next we must show that (G; f) represents Pl
(G;f)
. The rst step is to show that
Pl
(G;f)
(X = xjPar
G
(X) = z) = d
X=xjPar
G
(X)=z
. Note that by (13),
Pl
(G;f)
(X = xjPar
G
(X) = z)
 Pl
(G;f)
(Par
G
(X) = z) = Pl
(G;f)
(X = x \ Par
G
(X) = z):
By denition,
Pl
(G;f)
(X = x \ Par
G
(X) = z) = 
fx:X=x
0
(X=x\Par
G
(X)=~y)g
Pl
(G;f)
(X = x
0
):
Each term in the \sum" on the right is the \product" of terms; indeed, the sum is over all
possible products that include d
X=yjPar
G
(X)=z
as one of the terms and a term d
Y=yjPar
G
(Y )=z
0
for each Y 2 Par
G
(X), where y is the component of z corresponding to Y . By using BN1,
BN3, R1, and R2, it is not hard to show that
Pl
(G;f)
(X = y \ Par
G
(X) = z)
= 
f:X=x
0
(X=x\Par
G
(X)=~y)
Pl
(G;f)
(X = x
0
)
= d
X=xjPar
G
=z

 Pl
(G;f)
(Par
G
(X) = z):
(14)
It now follows from BN4 that Pl
(G;f)
(X = xjPar
G
(X) = z) = d
X=xjPar
G
(X)=z
.
To show that Pl
(G;f)
(X = xjND
G
(X) = ~y \ Par
G
(X) = z) = d
X=xjPar
G
(X)=z
, it suces
to show that
Pl
(G;f)
(X = x \ND
G
(X) = ~y \ Par
G
(X) = z)
= d
X=xjPar
G
(X)=z

 Pl
(G;f)
(ND
G
(X) = ~y \ Par
G
(X) = z);
(15)
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for then the result follows by BN5. (15) can be shown much like (14), but now the commu-
tativity of 
 (BN1) is essential. That is, the expressions for Pl
(G;f)
(X = x \ ND
G
(X) =
~y \ Par
G
(X) = z) and d
X=xjPar
G
(X)=z

 Pl
(G;f)
(ND
G
(X) = ~y \ Par
G
(X) = z) involve
the same terms, but not necessarily in the same order. With commutativity, they can be
permuted so that they are in the same order.
Similar arguments, which I leave to the reader, show that Pl
(G;f)
(ND
G
(X) = ~yjX =
x \Par
G
(X) = z) = Pl
(G;f)
(ND
G
(X) = ~yjPar
G
(X) = z). Thus, (G; f) represents Pl
(G;f)
.
Theorem 5.10: Suppose that (D;;
) is a rich BN-compatible domain. Then if I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ)
holds for every plausibility measure in PL
D;;

compatible with G, then d-sep
G
(X;YjZ).
Proof: Suppose that X is not d-separated from Y by Z in G. Then there is some X 2 X
and Y 2 Y such that X is not d-separated from Y by Z in G. I construct a cpm in
Pl 2 PL
D;;

such that I
rv
Pl
(X;Y jZ) does not hold, using the techniques of (Geiger et al.,
1990).
As shown in (Geiger et al., 1990, Lemma 9), if X is not d-separated from Y in G, there
exists a subgraph G
0
of G such that
1. G
0
includes all the nodes in G but only a subset of the edges in G,
2. X is not d-separated from Y by Z in G
0
.
3. the edges E
0
in G
0
consist only of those specied below:
(a) a trail q from X to Y ,
(b) for every head-to-head node X
i
on the trail q, there is a directed path p
i
in G
0
to
a node in Z; moreover, the paths p
i
do not share any nodes and the only node
that p
i
shares with q is X
i
.
Note that every node inG
0
has either 0, 1, or 2 parents inG
0
. Let (G
0
; f) be a quantitative
Bayesian network such that for each node in X in G
0
with no parents in G
0
, the cpt f(X)
is such that d
X=0
= d and d
X=1
= d
0
. If a node X in G
0
has one parent, say X
0
, then the
cpt f(X) is such that d
X=ijX
0
=j
is > if i = j and ? if i 6= j. Finally, if X has two parents,
say X
0
and X
00
, the cpt f(X) is such that d
X=kjX
0
=i\X
00
=k
is > if k = i j(mod2) and is ?
otherwise. Since d d
0
= > and BN2 guarantees that >? = >, the construction satises
R1. The richness of D guarantees that R2 holds. By Theorem 5.6, there is a (unique)
plausibility measure in Pl 2 PL
D;;

that is represented by (G
0
; f). It is easy to check that
Pl is compatible with G as well. There are three cases to consider:
 Suppose that X has no parents in G
0
. Then it is easy to see that I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) for all
Y and Z (and, in particular, if Y = ND
G
(X) and Z = Par
G
(X)).
 Suppose that X has one parent in G
0
, say X
0
. Then it is easy to see that I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ)
holds for all Y and Z such that X
0
2 Z. Since X
0
is a parent of X in G, again
I
rv
Pl
(X;ND
G
(X)jPar
G
(X)) must hold.
 Finally, if X has two parents in G
0
, say X
0
and X
00
, then it is easy to see that
I
rv
Pl
(X;YjZ) holds for all Y and Z such that fX
0
;X
00
g  Z. Since X
0
and X
00
are
parents of X in G, again I
rv
Pl
(X;ND
G
(X)jPar
G
(X)) must hold.
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